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THE ART OF NAILING JELL-O TO THE WALL:
REASSESSING THE POLITICAL POWER OF THE
INTERNET
Bryan Druzin* & Jessica Li**
Political observers commonly argue that, given the unique
characteristics of the Internet, democratization is an inevitability
of its widespread use. The critical role that social media played in
the wave of demonstrations, protests, and revolutions that swept
across the Arab world in 2011 cemented this perception in the
minds of many. Yet China defies this simplistic paradigm—China
has been stunningly successful at constraining the political power
of its Internet. We argue that the political importance of Internet
technology has been overstated, particularly with respect to China.
As support for this thesis, we cite recent political events in Hong
Kong known as the “Umbrella Revolution,” arguing that the
failure of these protests to spark wider unrest in the remainder of
China—or even among the greater Hong Kong population—belies
the simplistic notion that the Internet is a technological blueprint
for political transformation irrespective of a society’s particular
socio-economic, political, and historical characteristics. The
ability of the Internet to mobilize civil disobedience is extremely
limited and easily contained but for circumstances where the
population is already highly mobilized.
Prior to the Hong Kong protests, the international community
had yet to witness a Chinese society boasting an advanced use of
Internet technology engaging in large-scale public protest. As
such, the protests provided an opportunity to test this Internet*
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democratization thesis in a Chinese context. We argue that the
failure of the Hong Kong protests to galvanize wider dissent, even
within this unique pocket of China afforded legal and
technological advantages not available elsewhere in the country,
suggests that different results should not be expected in the rest of
China and that the popular Internet-democratization thesis is an
unwarranted assumption. The thesis cannot be overgeneralized
irrespective of cultural conditions. Some societies are very good at
pacifying the democratizing potential of the Internet. The failure of
the Hong Kong protests shows this.
INTRODUCTION
Controlling the information available to citizens is often vital
to the preservation of political power, and is one of the essential
means by which authoritarian governments have historically
sustained political monopoly. Yet with the advent of the Internet,
the world of communications has undergone a revolution, creating
new possibilities that challenge government control over the flow
of information and by extension over public opinion. In the early
days of the Internet, the technology quickly emerged as a central
component in liberal visions of democratization, taking on an
almost mythical quality.1 Many asserted that the Internet was
1

See generally CHRISTOPHER R. KEDZIE, COMMUNICATION AND
DEMOCRACY: COINCIDENT REVOLUTIONS AND THE EMERGENT DICTATOR’S
DILEMMA (1997) (finding that interconnectivity is a strong predictor of
democracy). See also Christopher R. Kedzie, A Brave New World or a New
World Order?, in CULTURE OF THE INTERNET 209–32 (Sara Kiesler ed., 1997)
(examining the impact of Internet technology on political regimes and arguing
such technology empowers citizens); Trevor Locke, Participation, Inclusion,
Exclusion and Netactivism: How the Internet Invents New Forms of Democratic
Activity, in DIGITAL DEMOCRACY: DISCOURSE AND DECISION MAKING IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 211–21 (Barry N. Hague & Brian D. Loader eds., 1999)
(arguing that the Internet empowers online activism); THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN,
THE LEXUS AND THE OLIVE TREE: UNDERSTANDING GLOBALIZATION (2000)
(famously arguing that the interconnected nature of globalization is inducing
integration); GORDON C. CHANG, THE COMING COLLAPSE OF CHINA 90 (2001)
(“The Internet is the force that will bring about change in the world’s most
populous nation, for it is where all that is positive in China converges. The
regime may patrol cyberspace, but it cannot help but be changed in the
process.”); Paul Nixon & Hans Johansson, Transparency Through Technology:
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uniquely immune to government control, and as such, would
destroy hierarchical orders of authority, defy any restrictions
placed on it, and unleash a free exchange of information and ideas
worldwide.2 In short, the Internet would precipitate the demise of
the authoritarian state and democratize societies heretofore
resistant to political change.3 While some scholars now question
the strength of this assumption, this vision of the Internet remains
cemented in the minds of many.4 The recent wave of
The Internet and Political Parties, in DIGITAL DEMOCRACY: DISCOURSE AND
DECISION MAKING IN THE INFORMATION AGE, 135–53 (Barry N. Hague & Brian
D. Loader eds., 1999) (examining the political impact of Internet technology);
Jianhai Bi, The Internet Revolution in China: The Significance for Traditional
Forms of Communist Control, 56 INT’L J. 421–44 (2001) (drawing a link
between internet growth and political liberalization). But see EVGENY
MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION: THE DARK SIDE OF INTERNET FREEDOM (2012)
(arguing that the belief in the democratizing nature of the Internet lacks
support); Tamara Renee Shie, The Tangled Web: Does the Internet Offer
Promise or Peril for the Chinese Communist Party?, 13 J. CONTEMP. CHINA
523, 524 (2004) [hereinafter Shie, The Tangled Web] (debunking the idea that
internet liberalization will inevitably lead to democratization in the case of
China); DARIN BARNEY, PROMETHEUS WIRED: THE HOPE FOR DEMOCRACY IN
THE AGE OF NETWORK TECHNOLOGY (2000) (challenging the Internet’s ability
to spark democratic transformation); MATTHEW HINDMAN, THE MYTH OF
DIGITAL DEMOCRACY (2009) (arguing that the Internet, rather than broadening
political discourse, in fact has empowered a small class of political elites).
2
See supra note 1.
3
See MOROZOV, supra note 1, at xii (arguing that this perception of the
democratization power of the Internet stems largely from a selective and often
incorrect reading of history, specifically the impact of interconnectivity and the
collapse of the Soviet Union); see also Richard Barbrook & Andy Cameron, The
Californian Ideology, 6 SCI. AS CULTURE 44 (1996) (arguing that the culture of
Silicon Valley in the 1990s embraced an ideology of radical individualism,
libertarianism, and neoliberal economics). For a recent analysis discussing the
potential breakdown of cyber-censorship from a behavioral economics
perspective, see Bryan Druzin & Jessica Li, Censorship’s Fragile Grip on the
Internet: Can Online Speech be Controlled?, 49 CORNELL INT'L L.J. (2016)
(forthcoming) (arguing that the structural nature of the Internet renders cybercensorship susceptible to sudden collapse).
4
See, e.g., Guobin Yang, The Internet as Cultural Form: Technology and
the Human Condition in China, 22 KNOWLEDGE TECH. & POL’Y 109, 109
(2009). These “assumptions of technological determinism” appear to have
shifted from declaring that Internet technology was destined to stimulate
democratization to arguing that this assumption is dead wrong. See id. In this
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demonstrations, protests, and revolutions that swept across the
Arab world, known as the Arab Spring, has reinforced this
perception—what one scholar has termed cyber utopianism.5 The
Arab Spring engendered a widespread sense of inevitability that
the democratizing properties of Internet technology would
empower opposition movements in authoritarian and semiauthoritarian regimes.6 The Internet—particularly the use of social
media7—is now popularly portrayed as an unstoppable
democratizing force for the world, the narrative being that the
Internet gives voice to millions, and these voices, once raised in
chorus, cannot then be silenced.8
Yet many scholars cannot help but note that China defies this
simplistic paradigm.9 Utopian talk of the democratizing force of
article, we examine this assumption with respect to China in light of recent
events in Hong Kong. The conclusion we draw places us squarely in the second
camp.
5
MOROZOV, supra note 1, at xiii–xvii. Cyber Utopianism is the notion that
the Internet is innately emancipatory, its decentralized structure favoring the
politically oppressed. Morozov contrasts this with what he calls “cyber-realism.”
Id. at 319–20.
6
Id. at 322 (“Western governments are also doubling their ‘Internet
freedom’ efforts, especially after the Arab Spring. The Internet Freedom Agenda
is alive and kicking . . . .”). The toppling of the Egyptian regime of Hosni
Mubarak in early 2011 has been described as the “Twitter Revolution” because
of the use of Twitter, Facebook and other such Internet-based social media by
protest groups in coordinating their opposition. See Ethan Zuckerman, The First
Twitter Revolution?, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jan. 15, 2011), http://foreignpolicy.com/
2011/01/15/the-first-twitter-revolution-2/; see also ASHU M. G. SOLO,
HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN THE INFORMATION AGE
305 (2014); YING JIANG, CYBER-NATIONALISM IN CHINA: CHALLENGING
WESTERN MEDIA PORTRAYALS OF INTERNET CENSORSHIP IN CHINA 6 (2012);
JOHN H. PARMELEE & SHANNON L. BICHARD, POLITICS AND THE TWITTER
REVOLUTION: HOW TWEETS INFLUENCE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
POLITICAL LEADERS AND THE PUBLIC 16 (2012).
7
While we are concerned here with Internet technology at large, the
discussion that follows focuses on the use of social media, as social media has
proven itself as an especially effective instrument to mobilize civil disobedience.
However, where the term “social media” is used, the reader may understand this
to also refer to the Internet more generally. In many instances, the terms are used
interchangeably.
8
See JIANG, supra note 6, at 7.
9
Id.
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the Internet simply falls flat when the conversation turns to China.
U.S. President Bill Clinton once confidently remarked that the
Internet defies centralized control, comparing the attempt to
constrain online discourse to trying to “nail Jell-O to the wall.”10 It
would seem, however, that China has mastered the art of Jell-O
nailing. The notion that the decentralized nature of social media,
once properly activated, acts as a conflagrating force for political
transformation draws a great deal of validation from the events of
the Arab Spring. Yet we must be careful not to overgeneralize this
Internet-democratization thesis. It is naïve to suppose that this
technology ensures the breaking down of information hierarchies
or that it is somehow a shortcut to political transformation. This
article argues that the protests calling for universal suffrage that
erupted on the streets of Hong Kong in autumn 2014—referred to
as the “Umbrella Revolution”—show the limits of social media in
igniting political change, specifically in the case of China. Prior to
the Hong Kong protests, the international community had yet to
witness a Chinese society boasting an advanced use of Internet
technology engaging in large-scale public protest. As such, the
protests provided an opportunity to test the Internetdemocratization thesis in a Chinese context.
We argue that the failure of these demonstrations to spark
wider protests in the rest of China, or even among the greater Hong
Kong population, greatly weakens the Internet-democratization
thesis. Their failure to galvanize wider dissent, even within this
unique pocket of China afforded legal and technological
advantages not available elsewhere in the country, suggests that
different results should not be expected in the rest of China. The
Hong Kong protests show that the ability of the Internet to amplify
social agitation and mobilize civil disobedience is extremely
limited and easily contained but for circumstances where the
population is already highly mobilized. This being the case, the
value of the Internet-democratization thesis is very limited and we
would do well to retire the idea.
10

William J. Clinton, President of the U.S., Remarks at the Paul H. Nitze
School of Advanced International Studies (Mar. 8, 2000), in CLINTON’S
FOREIGN POLICY: A DOCUMENTARY RECORD 194, 198 (Philip E. Auerswald et
al. eds., 2003).
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The political power of social media has been mischaracterized
and its potency exaggerated. The notion that the Internet is an
innately energizing political force is simply inaccurate. The failure
of the Hong Kong protests to gain traction shows that the impact of
Internet technology varies greatly across cultures and is not an
instant recipe for political transformation. A more nuanced
understanding that takes seriously the socio-political differences
between societies is needed. While the Internet may provide a
powerful forum for communication, collective mobilization
requires a politically engaged population. In the case of China, this
is not robustly present. The Chinese people appear far more
concerned with achieving material prosperity than flirting with
political dissent.11 Moreover, the Chinese government has proven
itself quite adept at maintaining this indifference. The success with
which China has muted the transformative power of social media
seriously challenges the viability of the Internet-democratization
11

This is particularly true among China’s young Internet users. See, e.g.,
HELEN SUN, INTERNET POLICY IN CHINA: A FIELD STUDY OF INTERNET CAFES
250 (2010) (“The attempts to control, along with the official culture and political
atmosphere, seem to have produced political apathy among many Internet users,
especially teenagers.”); see also JIANG, supra note 6, at 112 (noting the younger
generation’s “political apathy” oddly coexisting with “passionate patriotism”);
Yi Mou et al., Predicting Political Discussion in a Censored Virtual
Environment, 28 POL. COMM. 341, 351 (2011) (noting the significant lack of
political involvement among China’s student population); FENGSHU LIU, URBAN
YOUTH IN CHINA: MODERNITY, THE INTERNET AND THE SELF 53 (2011) (noting
that urban Chinese youth are far less politicized than their counterparts in the
late 1980s); David Barboza, For Chinese, the Web is the Way to Entertainment,
N.Y. Times (Apr. 18, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/19/technology/1
9chinaweb.html (“[Y]oung people in China say they are excited about the Web
not because it offers a means to rebellion, but because it gives them a wide
variety of social and entertainment options.”). This political indifference has
also been noted among China’s entrepreneurial class. See XIAOQIN GUO, STATE
AND SOCIETY IN CHINA’S DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION: CONFUCIANISM, LENINISM,
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 134 (2003) (“[D]espite their significant role in
shaping China’s economy, Chinese private entrepreneurial groups have been
inactive in the political process. The most notable indicator of their political
passivity is that they were rarely seen during the Tiananmen events.”). But see
Zhong Yang & Hu Wei, Mass Political Interest in Urban China: An Empirical
Study, CHINA: AN INT’L J., Dec. 2013, at 87, 87–91 (relying on empirical
research of urban regions to argue that the perception that there are low levels of
political interest among the Chinese is mistaken).
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thesis. So long as a sufficient degree of political disinterest can be
sustained, no amount of social media will generate large-scale civil
disobedience. There simply is no tinder to be ignited. The failure
of the Hong Kong protests to stimulate broader political unrest in
China speaks to Beijing’s success at blunting the political potential
of its Internet and the weakness of the Internet-democratization
thesis more generally.
We develop our argument in four parts. Part I examines the
political power of the Internet and social media. Here we show that
the information-sharing capability of Internet technology has
provided fuel for democratization in many instances––most
notably in the case of the Arab Spring. Part II explains how China
defies this paradigm and describes the broader strategy China
employs to pacify its Internet. Part III then discusses the critical
role of political apathy in preventing the emergence of large-scale
online activism. As support for our thesis, Part IV argues that the
failure of the Hong Kong protests to spark broader social unrest in
Hong Kong suggests that the ability of social media to ignite civil
disobedience within Chinese society is far more limited than many
believe.
I. THE POLITICAL POWER OF SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE ARAB
SPRING
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the notion that the
world was democratizing and that the West was destined to
spearhead this democratization gained new life.12 Scholars from
Francis Fukuyama13 to Samuel Huntington14 and Theda Skocpol15
12

PETER J. MUNSON, WAR, WELFARE & DEMOCRACY: RETHINKING
AMERICA’S QUEST FOR THE END OF HISTORY 11–12 (2013); see also Francis
Fukuyama, Liberal Democracy as a Global Phenomenon, 24 PS: POL. SCI. &
POL. 659, 659 (1991) (noting a global trend towards democracy).
13
See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST
MAN (1992) (arguing the existence of an end-point of humanity’s socio-cultural
evolution boasting a final form of human government).
14
See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS
AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996) (arguing that culture and religion
would assume the mantle as a driving force for global conflict in the post-Cold
War world).
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supplied bold predictions and answers as to what the process of
democratization would constitute and the form that it would likely
take. Fukuyama famously proclaimed the “end of history,”
anointing western-style democracy as the final form of
government.16 Others like Seymour Martin Lipset famously
posited that certain social and economic conditions, such as
economic wealth, a strong middle class, and capitalism, would
eventually bring about democracy the world over.17 This line of
thought has continued well into the 21st century and the Internet
has come to feature prominently in this liberalization story.
A. The Liberalization Story Meets the Internet
Many observers of nondemocratic regimes argue that the
Internet has become a gateway for a more dynamic interplay
between those opposed to the state, creating new opportunities for
the revitalization of opposition movements.18 In a time of instant
communication, the compartmentalization of the world is gradually
15

See generally THEDA SKOCPOL, SOCIAL REVOLUTIONS IN THE MODERN
WORLD (Peter Lange et al. eds., 1994) (examining the occurrence of
revolutionary upheavals around the world).
16
See generally FUKUYAMA, supra note 13 (arguing that western liberal
democracy represents the endpoint of humanity’s sociocultural evolution and the
apex of human government). For an earlier iteration of the thesis, see Francis
Fukuyama, The End of History? NAT’L INTEREST, Summer 1989, at 3 (arguing
that with the collapse of Communism, liberal democracy stood alone as the only
form of government compatible with socio-economic modernity).
17
Seymour Martin Lipset, The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited,
59 AM. SOC. REV. 1, 3 (1994) [hereinafter Lipset, The Social Requisites of
Democracy Revisited] (noting the conditions driving the global transition from
authoritarian regimes to more pluralistic political systems); see also Robert J.
Barro, Determinants of Democracy, 107 J. POL. ECON. 158 (1999) (examining
the correlation between improvements in the standard of living and
democratization); Barbara Wejnert, Diffusion, Development, and Democracy,
1800–1999, 70 AM. SOC. REV. 53 (2005) (critically examining development
indicators as predictors of democracy); SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET & JASON M.
LAKIN, THE DEMOCRATIC CENTURY (2004) (employing social, cultural,
economic, and institutional analyses to explain the emergence of robust
democracies in some countries and its failure to emerge in others).
18
ZIXUE TAI, THE INTERNET IN CHINA: CYBERSPACE AND CIVIL SOCIETY
188 (2006).
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dissolving, making it increasingly difficult for political elites to
insulate their people from such change. The “information
revolution that began after World War II with the proliferation of
computers and advanced communications systems,” was quickly
recognized by many as a “powerful and positive force for [global]
change.”19 The Internet has amplified this force a thousand-fold.
Since its inception, the Internet has carried with it an
antiauthoritarian feeling, and has been envisioned by social
scientists, politicians and communication practitioners to be a
potentially liberating and democratizing force in the world.20 As
part of a wave of new advances made in information technology,
the Internet was regarded as a particularly potent instrument for the
spread of pluralism and democracy in countries that place
constrictions on political debate and participation.21 The rapid and
dramatic global expansion of information technology captured the
imagination of scholars and led to predictions that the Internet
would break down political control, usurping the tight-fisted reign
of authoritarian rule.22
Central to the Internet’s ability to corrode the authority of the
state is its ability to erode physical and political borders as
information bits travel along fiber-optic cables and satellite
bandwidths to reach millions around the world.23 The open-ended,
decentralized structure of this medium allows for the rapid
dissemination of information not previously seen with other forms
19

LESLIE DAVID SIMON ET AL., DEMOCRACY AND THE INTERNET 3 (Leslie
David Simon ed., 2002).
20
Shie, The Tangled Web, supra note 1, at 524.
21
INTERNET, GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRACY: DEMOCRATIC TRANSITIONS
FROM ASIAN AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVES 21 (Jens Hoff ed., 2006)
[hereinafter INTERNET, GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRACY].
22
For a crisp overview of the evolution of this literature as it relates to
China, see JIANG, supra note 6, at 5–8. The nature of the relationship between
the Internet and democratization has been widely argued. While this literature is
large, for recent book-length treatments see THE INTERNET DEMOCRACY AND
DEMOCRATIZATION (Peter Ferdinand ed., 2013); SHANTHI KALATHIL & TAYLOR
C. BOAS, OPEN NETWORKS, CLOSED REGIMES: THE IMPACT OF THE INTERNET ON
AUTHORITARIAN RULE (2010); JOSEPH Y. S. CHENG, WHITHER CHINA’S
DEMOCRACY? DEMOCRATIZATION IN CHINA SINCE THE TIANANMEN INCIDENT
177–214 (2011). See also supra note 1.
23
SIMON ET AL., supra note 19, at 9.
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of print and broadcast media.24 The speed of the Internet’s
diffusion would seem to suggest a greater capability of the
technology to elude central government control or at the very least,
render it extremely difficult for states to restrain. With the world’s
information resources now readily within reach and with the ability
to publish one’s views now open to virtually anyone with a
computer or hand-held device and an Internet connection, this
powerful mode of expression promises to radically alter the
political landscape of many societies.25 But more than just
unconstrained expression, the Internet provides the ideal venue for
individuals with like views and interests to freely associate, share
information, and jointly advance their agendas—political or
otherwise.26
It is this democratizing characteristic of the Internet that poses
the greatest challenge to dictatorial regimes, as the empowerment
of citizens may bring about the slow erosion of authority. The
nature of the Internet limits the ability of governments to regulate
the activities in which citizens engage online.27 As Lawrence
Lessig explains: “Borders keep people in, and hence governments
could regulate. Cyberspace undermines this balance . . . . The shift
is away from the power of government to regulate, and toward the
power of individuals to escape government regulation.”28 The
Internet permits access to a vast array of information from global
sources, increasing the ability of citizenry to bypass statecontrolled media and to think outside the political parameters
established by the government. The sheer breadth of information
now available for online scrutiny is a haven of knowledge for a
growing middle class. As those countries which insist on
maintaining twentieth-century methods of conducting business will
be doomed to failure, states will increasingly be forced to embrace
the Internet as a basic component of a modern infrastructure. The
necessity of Internet technology will therefore push governments
into a state of political vulnerability as lines of communication and
24
25
26
27
28

(1999).

INTERNET, GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRACY, supra note 21, at 26.
Id. at vii.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 206–07
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information sharing between citizens previously unimaginable
become fixtures of daily life. While the degree of interconnectivity
now provided by Facebook alone was inconceivable two decades
ago, heightened interconnection has now become a commonplace
feature of modern life for a vast swath of humanity.29
B. The Arab Spring
As indicated in our introduction, there is every reason to
believe that this optimistic vision is true—that the Internet is
indeed the vehicle for political change it has been widely hailed as.
The last half-decade has provided several demonstrations of the
transformational impact of the Internet upon the growth of
opposition movements, and succor for those who herald the
political power of social media.30 In a technologically
interdependent age, the Internet has forever altered the dynamics of
dissent. Indeed, the power of social media to undermine
authoritarian governments was dramatically showcased to the
world by the events known as the Arab Spring. Beginning in
January 2011, a sudden torrent of public protest swept across much
of the Arab world, toppling long-ruling autocratic regimes in
Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, and sparking bloody demonstrations in
Bahrain and Yemen.31 Protests soon sprang up in Syria, dragging
that country into a bloody civil war that continues to rage.32 The
use of social media, such as Twitter and Facebook, played a

29

The number of active users on Facebook (defined as those who log into
the service at least once a month) now reaches a jaw-dropping 1.39 billion
people. See Steve Rosenbush, The Morning Download: Companies Using Big
Data to Read Emotion, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/cio
/2015/01/29/the-morning-download-companies-using-big-data-to-read-emotion/.
30
For an interesting counter-argument, see LESSIG, supra note 28, at 5–6
(arguing that the early decentralized, libertarian spirit of the Internet is
transforming as the result of market influence).
31
SEAN ADAY ET AL., U.S. INST. OF PEACE, NEW MEDIA AND CONFLICT
AFTER THE ARAB SPRING 3 (2012), http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/
PW80.pdf.
32
See generally, TOM COOPER, SYRIAN CONFLAGRATION: THE SYRIAN
CIVIL WAR 2011–2013 (2015).
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decisive role in propelling these events forward.33 The toppling of
the regime of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt in early 2011 is now widely
described as the “Twitter Revolution” because of the use of
Twitter, Facebook, and other social media by protest groups to
mobilize their opposition.34 The protesters who organized in Tahrir
Square in central Cairo maintained a strong online presence, using
Facebook pages to coordinate their demonstrations.35 Social media
served as a key conduit of communication for the disaffected youth
that rallied in great numbers against the Mubarak regime.36
Protesters were able to “build extensive networks, create social
capital, and organize political action.”37 In many respects, the
events of the Arab Spring confirmed the early predictions of
political scientists who heralded the coming political impact of
Internet-based technology. Indeed, their prognostications came to
startling fruition in the heart of the Islamic world.
The events of the Arab Spring suggest that the revolutionary
force of the Internet will inexorably force open political and social
systems. Yet the truth, it seems, is far more nuanced. Indeed, more
recent events in the Middle East demonstrate that the power of
social media may be harnessed for decidedly nondemocratic ends.
The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), also known as the
Islamic State (IS) and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant
(ISIL), is presently demonstrating remarkable technological savvy
with its use of Internet platforms such as YouTube and other
Internet-based media as a propaganda and recruiting tool targeting

33

For a thorough discussion of the role of social media during the Arab
Spring, see MOHAMMAD-MUNIR ADI, THE USAGE OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE
ARAB SPRING: THE POTENTIAL OF MEDIA TO CHANGE POLITICAL LANDSCAPES
THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA 23–28 (2014); Philip N. Howard
& Muzammil M. Hussain, Egypt and Tunisia: The Role of Digital Media, in
LIBERATION TECHNOLOGY: SOCIAL MEDIA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
DEMOCRACY 110, 110 (Larry Diamond & Marc F. Plattner eds., 2012).
34
See supra note 7.
35
See LYOMBE EKO, NEW MEDIA, OLD REGIMES: CASE STUDIES IN
COMPARATIVE COMMUNICATION LAW AND POLICY 151 (2012).
36
See id.
37
PHILLIP N. HOWARD & MUZAMMIL M. HUSSAIN, DEMOCRACY’S FOURTH
WAVE?: DIGITAL MEDIA AND THE ARAB SPRING 65–66 (2013).
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disaffected Muslim youth across the world.38 ISIS’s use of social
media undercuts the notion that the political power of Internet
technology is destined to bring about a flowering of democratic
freedom. Indeed, it has become disturbingly clear that social media
may be used for ends of a decidedly nondemocratic nature.
One of the major deficiencies in past research is a tendency to
make generalizations regarding the political impact of the Internet
and social media based solely on the Internet’s technical and
architectural features, thereby abstracting and decontextualizing
the technology from the national and political contexts in which it
is employed. An examination of the experience of China shows
that the technology does not produce uniform and undifferentiated
effects across varying countries and contexts. Internet technology
is not a blueprint for social change that can simply be grafted from
one society to another irrespective of the socioeconomic and
political differences that exist between disparate cultures. Indeed,
the impact of the Internet does not hold equally across dissimilar
regions and cultures. There is a real need, therefore, to understand
the unique evolution of the Internet in the case of China.
II. HOW CHINA CENSORS ITS INTERNET INTO SUBMISSION
With respect to China, there may appear at first blush support
for this liberalization story. This was particularly true in the early
days of China’s Internet. It seemed as if a growing chat room
culture and online news media offering less controlled news and
commentary than state-controlled offline news outlets would spur
the growth of independent public opinion in China. Many scholars
argued that the globalization of the world’s media industries, and
the universal market logic according to which they operated, posed
a unique challenge to China’s national media system as the Internet
stepped up the shift towards the marketization of the technology.39
38
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The arrival of Internet services and online news providers created
speculation that centralized control over the flow of information
was fated to slowly erode.40 Yet this Pollyannaish analysis turned
out to be erroneous. China has been extremely successful at
censoring its Internet into submission. If trying to control the
Internet is truly comparable to trying to nail Jell-O to the wall, then
China has mastered the art of ‘Jell-O nailing.’
If it was unclear in the early days of China’s Internet, there
now remains little question that China holds a powerful leash on its
Internet. The specific technological tactics essential to this feat—
such as selectively blocking websites, using human monitors to
scrutinize online content,41 flagging search words, and funneling
connections through a handful of state-run operators that act as
digital arteries to the outside world that may be filtered42—are well
known and need not be discussed here. While the technological
tactics are of course critical to China’s ability to restrain its
Internet, they are aimed at a much larger strategy. These tactics
reflect China’s broader goal of minimizing large-scale political
engagement in the form of collective protest—a feat China has, by
and large, accomplished with great success.43 What may come as a
surprise to many is that Beijing’s censorial aspirations appear to be
more limited than previously believed.44 China’s aim is simply to
diminish online discussion that may escalate into mass offline
dissent. Political discussion of a more general and even
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antigovernmental nature is left relatively undisturbed.45 As support
for this claim, we rely upon recent empirical findings from a
Harvard study conducted by Gary King, et al., which concludes
that, contrary to popular assumptions, Chinese authorities are far
more concerned with curtailing online discussion of the kind that
may spur political mobilization than preventing open political
discussion online.46 We discuss the King study below; however,
we need to first examine the current state of China’s Internet, from
both a technological and legal perspective.
A. The Current State of Things
When Internet technology was first established in China in the
1990s, a mere 23,000 Chinese, most of whom were government
officials and select academics, had access to the Internet.47 Since
then, the Internet has proliferated across the country. By 2008, the
number of China’s Internet users had risen to 253 million,
approximately a fifth of the population.48 At the end of 2013, the
number of users in China stood at approximately 618 million.49
This is an 8.5% increase from the previous year.50 Nearly half of
the entire country is now on the Internet (45.8%).51 China’s
Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) has
projected domestic Internet usage to climb to 800 million by 2015,
45
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a figure that would represent approximately 57% of the total
population.52 This is a truly staggering statistic considering that
much of China’s population is rural and poor, making it seemingly
difficult for those portions of the population to gain Internet
access.53 Advancing Internet technology, growing connectivity,
new telecommunication devices such as smartphones and other
electronic devices, along with ever higher literacy rates have lent
new momentum to people-to-people communications in China.
These statistics are mind boggling: by 2015, the majority of the
Chinese population will arguably enjoy a degree of connectivity
comparable to as if they were living on the same city block. Within
such a technological framework, the prospect for mass social
change may appear inevitable. However, while all the basic
characteristics of the Internet appear to add up to a strong
democratic bias, Beijing has been extraordinarily successful at
achieving the formidable task of reaping the benefits of the Internet
while blunting its political impact.
B. The Critical Role of Law
While China employs a broad range of technological strategies
to regulate its Internet, the primary weapon in Beijing’s arsenal is
law. Without such extensive regulatory scaffolding in place,
authorities would not be in a position to deploy any of this
technological prowess. To that end, China has skillfully erected a
legal framework that prevents the medium from straying into
impermissible territory. When the Internet was first introduced into
China in 1993,54 China’s online landscape was bound by few rules
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and regulations.55 However, once the number of users began to
climb, authorities quickly realized the Internet’s vast potential and
sought to rein in the new medium. Much of the concern
surrounding the use of the Internet was the exposure of citizens to
online content potentially subversive and damaging to the State.56
Given that the State has long had restrictions on the spread of
material related to pornography, gambling, and anything deemed
“counterrevolutionary,” regulatory precedent was already in place
for authorities to tighten their control over the new technology. As
such, it did not take long for China to construct a legal framework
to control its Internet. National security and stability, the
preservation of moral and ethical standards, along with the need to
punish violators of the law have constituted some of the stronger
arguments in favor of strictly regulating the Internet.57
China’s first Internet laws were enacted as early as 1994, and
additional regulations soon followed.58 Most notable is the
“Provisional Directive on the Management of International
Connections by Computer Information Networks in the PRC” (the
“Directive”), which was signed into effect in 1996 and conferred
sweeping authority on the central government to regulate the
country’s Internet.59 Since then, additional regulations have been
instituted, with some “explicitly exert[ing] the state’s control” over
online activities.60 Of particular note here is Article 15 of the
Directive, the “Measures for the Administration of Internet
Information Services,” which lists illegal online content.61 Such
content includes, but is not limited to, information which stands at
55
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variance with basic constitutional principles, “endangers national
security,
divulges
state
secrets,
subverts
the
government, . . . undermines national unification, . . . is detrimental
to the honor and interests of the state, . . . undermines the state’s
policy for religions, or . . . preaches evil cults or feudalistic and
superstitious beliefs.”62 Much of the vagueness of these measures
has been made more specific; however, key provisions remain
ambiguous.63 For example, what qualifies as “information which
endangers national security” remains unclear.
Such a sweeping legal framework may give the impression that
Chinese cyberspace is a sterile desert of tightly regulated speech
where political discussion critical of the State is immediately
suppressed. While this is a widespread perception, it is incorrect.
The immense size of Chinese cyberspace—its users now
numbering over a half billion people64—renders such an approach
exceedingly difficult if not logistically impossible. Contrary to
popular depictions of Chinese cyberspace as a bleak and apolitical
landscape, political discussion frequently emerges on China’s
Internet.65 If this seems opposed to the state’s interests, it is not.
The Chinese government permits “a broad range of expression,
including criticism of government policies, and recognize[s] that in
a media environment as large and complex as China’s, it has to
pick its battles.”66 It appears that the goal is not to curtail all forms
of political speech on the Internet, but rather to minimize certain
forms of online speech.67 Let us now examine the skill with which
China implements this strategy.
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C. Political Speech versus Collective-Action Speech
Despite popular misconceptions, Chinese authorities do not
completely censor online discussion critical of the government—a
healthy degree of criticism is in fact quite prevalent and even
scathing criticism of the government is, for the most part, not
censored.68 Harvard scholar Gary King and his colleagues
analyzed the content of millions of Chinese social media posts
before Chinese authorities discovered, evaluated, and censored
those they deemed objectionable. The researchers then observed
which posts were censored. The research concluded that the goal
of the Chinese leadership is actually not “to suppress dissent, [or]
to prune human expression that finds fault with elements of the
Chinese state, its policies, or its leaders.”69 Rather, the research
suggests that China is primarily concerned with online discussion
that may produce public protests or other forms of collective
action.70
This second form of online discourse can be understood as
collective-action speech in contrast to the first kind, which may be
termed political speech. With respect to collective-action speech,
“the target of censorship is people who join together to express
themselves collectively, stimulated by someone other than the
government, and seem to have the potential to generate collective
action.”71 The goal is to “forestall collective activities that are
occurring now or may occur in the future.”72 Collective
mobilization of this nature is understandably threatening to the
Chinese government in that such discourse may be a source of
factionalism, a potential antecedent to social instability.73 As such,
68
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collective-action speech is far more pernicious than political
speech. The King study found that scathing censure of the
government does not appear to increase the likelihood of
censorship.74 Rather, “collective expression—many people
communicating on social media on the same subject—regarding
actual collective action, such as protests, as well as those about
events that seem likely to generate collective action but have not
yet done so, are likely to be censored.”75 Indeed, “[c]ontrary to
previous understandings, posts with negative, even vitriolic,
criticism of the state, its leaders, and its policies are not more likely
to be censored.”76 The program is far more targeted: “[T]he
censorship program is aimed at curtailing collective action by
silencing comments that represent, reinforce, or spur social
mobilization, regardless of content.”77 Indeed, the study found that
any posts that have collective action potential have a decidedly
higher chance of being censored—this is true even for posts that
were supportive of the government.78
The study indicates that authorities see collective mobilization
of any sort as a threat. Looking bad does not matter so long as
authorities minimize “collective action potential—where a locus of
power and control, other than the government, influences the
behaviours of masses of Chinese people.”79 These findings explain
the breadth of online criticism of government policies—such
criticism does represent a direct threat to social stability. The chief
goal of the Chinese government, it appears, is merely to sustain a
sufficient degree of political disinterest among its people. To this
end, online speech of a political nature is relatively benign;
however, online speech that encourages collective political
mobilization—collective-action speech—is not.80 In that collective
mobilization orchestrated by a non-governmental actor can
stimulate political engagement, collective-action speech represents
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
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a greater threat than mere political speech and is therefore taken
much more seriously by the authorities.81
China’s cyberspace is no stranger to intense political dialogue.
There are many examples from the early days of China’s Internet
of widespread discussions of contentious issues occurring in an
unpredictable and uncontrolled manner. For example, the bombing
of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia in 1999 and the
April 2001 incident involving a collision between a Chinese fighter
aircraft and an American military plane generated a torrent of
online debate.82 A more recent example is the anti-Japanese
protests that erupted in autumn 2012 when Japan nationalized part
of the Diaoyu islands (the Senkaku Islands) claimed by China.83
While there is now an impressive degree of frank discussion of
major events on China’s Internet,84 attempts to categorize such
discussion as being collective-action speech is difficult. Such
discussion is not geared towards collective mobilization. The
conversation in fact often strikes a distinctly nationalist tone.
Random events will occasionally invoke an outpouring of patriotic
fervor and anti-Western opinion. For example, in the spring of
2005, during the fallout in relations between China and Japan
concerning Japan’s alleged rewriting of its wartime atrocities in
history textbooks, the Strong Nation Forum (a bulletin board on
the website of the People’s Daily, an official newspaper of the
Communist Party) welcomed a deluge of anti-Japanese postings.85
If China’s overarching goal is to maintain political stability, it
makes perfect sense to broaden the ambit of acceptable discourse
in order to stave off a massive blowout of pent-up public
frustration that may prove highly destabilizing.
81
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This is perhaps best explained through analogy. A common
technique to prevent forest fires is to engage in what is known as
“controlled burning.” Controlled burning is the practice of
strategically setting fire to specific woodland areas in order to
consume fuel buildup to decrease the likelihood of more serious
fires.86 This is a good metaphor for China’s relationship with its
Internet. That China is now employing this strategy online should
not be that surprising given that this characterizes the behavior of
authorities offline: small-scale public protests, where they do flare
up, are largely tolerated.87 Empirical work on this shows that
toleration—monitoring the protest but refraining from using
force—is by far the most common response by authorities.88 This
toleration is highly strategic in that public discontent may be
exhausted in a relatively controlled manner. In this way, more
serious “fires” of dissent that may manifest in the form of
collective mobilization are skillfully averted. In essence, the
Internet is used as a tool to conduct the controlled burning of civic
discontent. By tolerating a high degree of online discussion, the
state is realistic about the fact that citizens in a country that is
bursting with economic growth will acquire and deliberate new
ideas, and will need to voice their dissatisfaction.89 These efforts
are aimed at one larger goal—sustaining a general level of political
disengagement among the Chinese people. This is a crucial point
to which we now turn.
III. A GENTLE EQUILIBRIUM OF POLITICAL DISENGAGEMENT
What China has accomplished is nothing short of astounding.
Authorities have successfully developed the nation’s Internet,
86
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reaping the economic and infrastructural benefits this entails, while
sustaining a gentle equilibrium of political disengagement. We
define political disengagement not as the absence of online
discussion of a political nature, but as the absence of a politically
energized population willing to collectively agitate for sweeping
political transformation. Indeed, the first may be present while the
second totally absent. While online political discussion may exist,
even in a widespread manner,90 genuine political engagement is
largely absent among the Chinese population.91 A general mood of
political disinterest among the majority of the Chinese population
dominates.92 So long as this is present, no amount of online
activism can ever produce large-scale civil disobedience.
The colossal size of China’s Internet renders any top-down
attempts at control ineffective but for an undercurrent of deep
political disengagement within Chinese society. As such, the
overarching concern of China is simply to sustain political
disengagement among its people—something that it seems to have
achieved with remarkable success. A fire requires fuel and there
appears to be an absence of such fuel in China. There is a tendency
of analysts to paint the Chinese people as closeted revolutionaries
awaiting the opportunity to rise up in rebellion against their
government. This portrayal of Chinese society is inaccurate and
considerably naïve. Even where there arises online political
discussion of a highly critical nature, this seldom takes the form of
agitation for wholesale political transformation.93 Citizens
intermittently demand a remedying of specific policies with a goal
of achieving greater social or economic fairness—demonstrations
of this nature are not infrequent and have a long tradition in
China.94 However—and this is an important point—this still very
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much occurs within the existing political framework.95 The goal of
such demonstrations is not sweeping political transformation.96
Even where highly vocal, protesters “usually go to great lengths to
demonstrate their loyalty to central policies and leaders.”97
Ultimately, characterizing public discontent where it does emerge
as a hunger for sweeping political change is misleading.98 Across
the broad face of Chinese society, the population remains largely
politically disengaged—a characteristic that appears to be
especially common among the nation’s youth.99
A. Political Disengagement
An atmosphere of political disengagement permeates a great
deal of modern Chinese society. This characteristic appears
especially salient among China’s youth who, crucially, represent
the majority of the country’s Internet users.100 Among this
demographic there appears to be a deep sense of political inertia
seamlessly coexisting with a general mood of fervent patriotism.101
The bulk of Chinese netizens are not going online to forcefully
rally for political change, “make political statements[,] or to fight
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for their rights.”102 Chinese youth “are excited about the Web not
because it offers a means to rebellion, but because it gives them a
wide variety of social and entertainment options.”103 A series of
relatively recent nationwide surveys show that more than 50% of
Chinese Internet users do not post their opinions online at all.104
Contrary to early predictions, a robust civil society fuelled by the
Internet has not emerged in China. The specific brand of civil
society envisioned here is not the form that political scientist
Robert Putnam posits where civic engagement may include a range
of innocuous social activities including professional societies,
sports clubs and recreational organizations.105 These of course
exist.106 Nor is it, as one legal scholar defines it, “nongovernmental advocacy organizations, humanitarian service
organizations, unions, religious groups, civic and neighborhood
associations, political and social movements, information and news
media, educational associations, and certain forms of economic
organization.”107 The engagement of citizens in loosely-based
organizations is not taken to be an indication of a vigorous civil
society. This paper hews to a far more parsimonious definition: we
are primarily concerned with and define “civil society” as the
collection of activities that can be identified as strong agitation
against the state and government actions. This we termed political
102
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engagement. In the case of China, a society lacking robust
democratic traditions and accustomed to decades of political
abstemiousness, the inherently global structure of the Internet
clearly has not eroded the enduring authority of the nation state.
Many Internet users in fact seem quite comfortable having their
online activity regulated. Among the urban youth there is robust
support for government control over the Internet.108 A 2007 survey
revealed that over 80% of respondents felt that online activity
should be controlled and almost 85% cited the government as the
appropriate institution to oversee this.109 This same survey
indicated that the percentage of users who felt that online content
of a decidedly political nature should be controlled rose from 8%
in 2005 to 41%.110 It is unclear what the response rate would be if
the same survey were carried out today; however, it should be
noted that the trend in 2007 was steeply upwards. Moreover, those
who may benefit the most from counter-hegemonic uses of the
Internet, such as farmers’ groups and the peasantry, are precisely
those who are relatively deprived of online access.111 Internet
diffusion in rural regions remains relatively low 112 and the vast
majority of those with access are of middle to upper-class and
well-educated—precisely the people who are most likely to align
themselves with the government’s efforts at maintaining economic
growth and avoiding social instability that may threaten this
progress.
B. There Can Be No Fire Where There Is No Fuel
The mere existence of the Internet and the greater availability
of information have not prompted the average Chinese citizen to
engage in heated political discourse of a type that may serve as a
catalyst for large-scale collective mobilization. It does not appear
that China’s vast ocean of Internet users are applying their online
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networking skills for political engagement.113 The supposition that
many are in fact even interested in political engagement of this sort
would be a stretch, as most users are driven online for
entertainment purposes, to socialize, or gather information and
access educational services.114 While chat groups provide in theory
an opportunity for the congregation of like-minded individuals, in
practice, conversations are typically parochial and bland with
people sharing information on personal matters, travels, and
family, and contain little debate of current events or political
issues.115 Such political disengagement inhibits the transformative
potential of Internet technology. China serves as a potent example
of a government that has effectively contained the political power
of Internet technology. As a result, the majority of Chinese appear
politically disengaged.116 Although some may remain ignorant of
the true extent of the state’s manipulation of online content, it
would be more accurate to say that the vast majority simply does
not care. If the concept of civil society consists of basic elements
such as individuals who enjoy political autonomy, engage in
organized activities, and belong to a public sphere that is
politically energized, such characteristics have not manifested in
current Chinese society.117 There is a lack of evidence that the
existence of the Internet is in any way spurring political activism
of a hard line antigovernment character. There is talk instead of a
qualified form of online activism.118 This mostly takes the form of
a cooperative model where political change is pursued by
submitting ideas for reform-minded leaders rather than taking the
turbulent road of dissent.119
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The case of China has turned the liberalization story on its
head. Rather than outright content restriction, Chinese authorities
seem to have adopted a far more sophisticated model for
monitoring online content. The approach, as Clay Shirky explains,
“has evolved from a relatively simple filter of incoming Internet
traffic in the mid-1990s . . . . Because its goal is to prevent
information from having politically synchronizing effects, the state
does not need to censor the Internet comprehensively.”120 This is a
far more nuanced approach. Even the most interactive technology
holds no value if users possess little political motivation to employ
the technology towards such ends. A weak civil society in the brick
and mortar world will inevitably obstruct the emergence of an
online civil society—and this is precisely what has occurred in
China. Internet technology has not led to the rise of a robust civil
society online.
C. Balancing Internet Growth and Internet Control
The assumption that political liberalization necessarily
accompanies economic liberalization noted earlier is incorrect.121
MacKinnon, China’s “Networked Authoritarianism,” in WILL CHINA
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The error of this belief is only underscored by the consumerist,
entertainment-driven character of China’s Internet and its failure to
fuel the political liberalization once envisioned by scholars.122 The
case of China shows us that “the Internet can be a tool both for
democratization and its containment.”123 Beginning in 1979 with
the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China has pursued the
Latin America); Dankwart A. Rustow, Transitions to Democracy: Toward a
Dynamic Model, 2 COMP. POL. 337, 350–60 (1970) (arguing that all that was
needed was a sense of national unity and some kind of elite commitment to a
democratic transition). The case of China contradicts the Lipset thesis,
something that many scholars have noted. See, e.g., MARY ELIZABETH
GALLAGHER, CONTAGIOUS CAPITALISM: GLOBALIZATION AND THE POLITICS OF
LABOR IN CHINA (2011) (looking at the effect of foreign direct investment in
China and challenging the assumption that there is a causal relationship between
economic liberalization and democratization); Timothy Cheek & Juan D.
Lindau, Market Liberalization and Democratization: The Case for Comparative
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COMPARING CHINA AND MEXICO 3, 6 (Juan D. Lindau & Timothy Cheek eds.,
1998) (arguing that the assumption that market liberalization promotes
democracy is empirically uncertain and methodologically flawed). But some
China watchers still herald that democracy will follow the rise of a robust
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popularity of the thesis may be attributed to the support it provides for the global
expansion of capitalism witnessed throughout the 20th century and continuing
today. The notion that capitalism and democracy are inextricably linked
provides a great deal of theoretical cover for those who may have pecuniary
interests in penetrating the markets of politically illiberal societies. In fact, quite
an opposite claim could be made, one that at least seems ostensibly supported by
the case of China: with rising prosperity comes rising levels of political
indifference.
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modernization of both the industrial and technology sectors of the
economy, hoping to extricate the country from the isolation and
economic autarky characteristic of the Maoist period.124 As it
became apparent that the development of the telecommunications
sector would be vital to the economy and by extension, the stability
of social order, Chinese officials wholeheartedly embraced
information technology, making it a cornerstone of their
modernization schemes.125 China seems to be under no illusions
regarding the necessity of sustaining economic growth in order to
maintain political continuity and that key to this is fostering the
growth of the Internet.126 Chinese leaders understood early on that
the Internet was vital to economic growth, and adopted policies to
contribute to that growth,127 including investments in the country’s
academic and research network and the introduction of private
competition into telecommunications.128 However, they were
extraordinarily vigilant as to the potential of the Internet for the
growth of civil society in the country.129 At the same time that
China actively promoted Internet development as part of its pursuit
of economic growth and modernization, authorities realized that
the medium presented a potential challenge to government control
over information flows.130 The government’s answer was to enact
the extensive regulations to stem any potential political impact and
successfully stymie liberalization.131
As China demonstrates, the mere existence of technologies
such as the Internet has little to no relevance for
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democratization.132 The purely technical characteristic of the
medium along with its democratic potential cannot be divorced
from the sociopolitical factors that drive uses of such technologies
in specific ways and contexts. There remains little question that the
model of Internet democratization that so exhilarated theorists at
the close of the 20th century cannot be applied to China. Indeed,
developments in China’s Internet landscape belie the forgivably
naïve notion that the Internet eludes central control. China has
managed to stay ahead of the game by utilizing legislative and
administrative savvy to meet the nation’s need for Internet use
while maintaining a considerable degree of influence over its
content. If there is an inherent contradiction to the approach of
concurrently promoting and controlling the Internet, it is one that
China appears to have mastered.133 Indeed, China has struck a
pitch-perfect balance between Internet growth and Internet control.
IV. WHAT THE FAILURE OF HONG KONG’S “UMBRELLA
REVOLUTION” SHOWS US
The protests calling for universal suffrage that erupted on the
streets of Hong Kong in autumn 2014 further support the notion
that China has effectively constrained the democratizing power of
its Internet.134 The “Umbrella Revolution” ultimately failed to
spark wider protests in the rest of China—or even among the
greater Hong Kong population—despite the fact that Hong Kong
has unique legal and technological advantages not seen elsewhere
in China. It is therefore unlikely that similar protests could
galvanize support in regions of China that are not so advanced.
Prior to the Hong Kong protests, the international community had
132
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yet to witness a Chinese society boasting an advanced use of
Internet technology and social media engaging in large-scale
public protest. As such, the protests provided a unique opportunity
to test the popular meme that Internet technology, once properly
activated, is a force for political transformation. The Hong Kong
protests were a test of this supposition—one that failed. While the
case of Hong Kong may be distinguished from that of greater
China, the events of autumn 2014 provide the clearest indication to
date that the transformative power of the Internet, particularly with
regard to China, has been overstated.
A. The Hong Kong Protests: A “Perfect Storm” That
Never Came
We should be cautious to not exaggerate the political impact of
social media and the Internet with respect to China. We cannot
simply graft assumptions gleaned from other political events (i.e.,
the Arab Spring) onto the case of China, oblivious to the unique
circumstances in which China finds itself. Societies differ, and
often quite dramatically. The protests in Hong Kong presented an
opportunity to test the power of social media in a distinctly
Chinese context. The Hong Kong protests were an ideal case study
in that the protests possessed all the constituents of a perfect storm.
Unlike the rest of China, there is no regulation constraining Hong
Kong’s Internet beyond a limited number of laws that criminalize
the distribution of pirated materials, child pornography, and
obscene images.135 Freedom of expression in all its forms—speech,
print, cyberspace—is well-entrenched both legally as well as
socially and finds protection under the Hong Kong Bill of
Rights.136 In addition to the lack of legal restraints, Hong Kong
possesses an assembly of conditions that, at least on paper, render
it highly predisposed to the energizing effects of social media. To
this point, a comparison with the Arab Spring is extremely
informative. While the conditions of the Arab Spring gave rise to
135

See Control of Obscene and Indecent Articles Ordinance, (2003) Cap.
390, 4, § 8 (H.K.); Copyright Ordinance, (2007) Cap. 528, 9, § 22 (H.K.).
136
Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 383, 7, § 8(16)
(H.K.).

ART OF NAILING JELL-O TO THE WALL

33

sweeping political change, Hong Kong’s “Umbrella Revolution”
petered out despite the massive advantages these protesters had
over their Arab Spring counterparts. Indeed, these advantages were
many.
First and foremost, the Hong Kong protesters enjoyed a
substantial technological advantage over protesters in the Middle
East. In 2013, Internet penetration in Hong Kong was an
impressive 74.2%.137 In 2010, at the height of the Arab Spring,
Internet penetration in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya stood at 36.8%,
21.6%, and 14%, respectively.138 In Iran, during the 2009 protests,
access to the Internet was just 13.8%.139 In addition, smartphone
penetration in the Asia Pacific region has experienced exponential
growth in recent years, with smartphone ownership in Hong Kong
being amongst the highest in the world at 87%.140 Moreover, with
the Hong Kong protests being largely youth driven, its main
players were intimately familiar and comfortable with the use of
social media, and exploited those tools at their disposal to their full
advantage. This should come as little surprise considering that
Hong Kong ranks as the seventh most tech-savvy city in the
world.141 Additionally, innovations in social media have surged in
recent years and with them the ability for rapid communication and
group coordination. Demonstrators in Hong Kong mastered the use
of Twitter and Facebook along with newer messaging technologies
such as WhatsApp and WeChat.142 A recent and crucial addition to
social network technology, FireChat, requires neither cell reception
nor the Internet for communications between users. Instead, it
relies on the principle of mesh networking, enabling cellphones,
137
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where they are packed densely together, to communicate via Wi-Fi
signals and Bluetooth, with each mobile phone acting as an
additional node increasing the cellular network.143 During the
height of the protests, the FireChat app was downloaded close to a
half a million times in a single week in Hong Kong.144 Finally,
Hong Kong enjoys some distinct geographic advantages. Hong
Kong has a population of over seven million and an area of just
over 1000 square miles.145 The city’s population is among the
densest in the world and the journey on the city’s metro system
from end to end takes merely an hour. The lack of any real
logistical impediments to transporting and mobilizing
demonstrators suggests that virtually all those who sincerely
yearned to participate in the demonstrations were able to do so.
B. Reassessing the Political Power of the Internet in a
Chinese Context
The failure of the protests in Hong Kong to galvanize greater
civil disobedience forces us to re-evaluate the much-lauded
political power of the Internet, particularly with respect to China.
At the height of the protests, the participants numbered in the tens
of thousands, a significant turnout, but only a small percentage of
the city’s population of seven million.146 If Hong Kong’s
“Umbrella Revolution” could not sustain its momentum given all
143
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the legal and technological advantages at its disposal, how then can
different results be expected in greater China laboring under far
less favorable conditions? Compared with the rest of China, Hong
Kong had all the constituents of a perfect storm. The current level
of Internet penetration in Hong Kong (74.2%) is far higher than
that of China (45.8%).147 Even smartphone penetration in Hong
Kong (87%) significantly exceeds the rest of China (71%).148 In
the case of Hong Kong, there were clear grievances around which
the population could rally, grievances made well known to the
public through the unrestricted censure of its media. Hong Kong is
a Chinese city that operates under no legal or technological
constraints on its Internet, has a tradition of political engagement,
and benefits from a highly educated and politically informed
population.
Yet, despite all of these advantages, the protests failed to truly
take hold. The clouds of the perfect storm scattered swiftly. The
mood of the city quickly became one of fatigue, with many eager
to simply see a return to normalcy. As the protests dragged on
much of the initial support for the protesters waned.149 As such, the
Hong Kong protests tell us something unmistakable about the
potential of social media to achieve political change in a Chinese
context. In the wake of the Arab Spring, the political potency of
social media has, it seems, been greatly exaggerated. The Chinese
story is very different than the one that unfolded in the heart of the
Islamic world five years ago. Hong Kong’s “Umbrella Revolution”
testifies to the fact that even savvy use of the Internet by a
sophisticated subsection of the citizenry committed to amplifying
their voice by no means assures an escalation of political unrest.150
The purely technical characteristic of the medium cannot be
divorced from the historical and socioeconomic factors that drive
the use of such technologies in specific ways and contexts. The
broad array of conditions that fuelled the Arab Spring were clearly
147
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not present in Hong Kong, and this suggests they are equally, if not
more profoundly, absent in the rest of China. This is an important
insight for theorists inclined to prognosticate as to the
democratizing power of social media, particularly with respect to
China.
All of this conveys a very clear message: the simple presence
of protests and an effective use of social media is no guarantee of
political transformation. Indeed, Hong Kong’s “Umbrella
Revolution” tells us a great deal about the limits of social media.
With all the technological and legal advantages afforded the tens of
thousands who flooded the streets of Hong Kong in protest,
ultimately, their momentum could not be sustained. The failure of
the Hong Kong protests demonstrates that Internet technology is
not a technological blueprint for social change that can simply be
grafted onto a society irrespective of that culture’s socioeconomic,
political, and historical characteristics. Clearly, vital elements were
missing in the case of the Hong Kong protests. The failure of Hong
Kong’s “Umbrella Revolution” suggests that the ability of social
media to produce civil unrest within China is limited.
C. Common Assumptions about the Political Implications
of the Internet in China Are Inaccurate
Of course, it may be argued that the Chinese people are
laboring under a different set of social conditions than that of Hong
Kong and, as such, the comparison is unfair. Yet what the Hong
Kong protests offer is our best laboratory test to date for what
might happen in the rest of China. Many of the aspects of Hong
Kong society that may be pointed to as different than that of China
in fact make it more likely that the protests should have ignited
greater political dissent. For instance, Hong Kong has a long
history of political demonstrations and strikes.151 Chaotic, often
violent protests periodically erupted under British rule—in 1956,
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1966, 1967, and 1981.152 Given Hong Kong’s history of public
protest against British colonial rule, the people of Hong Kong are
not unfamiliar with large-scale political demonstrations.153 The
“Umbrella Revolution,” however, could not gain broader support
and eventually dissolved. It is unlikely therefore that similar
protests would gain momentum in mainland China, especially as
the conditions there make public demonstrations more challenging.
In its broad strokes, the Hong Kong protests represent the best case
study we have had up to now to assess the impact of social media
on political protest in Chinese society.
In the early years of the 21st century, theorists argued that the
Internet was destined to transform Chinese society in that the
technology allowed for the active engagement of netizens strongly
involved in the dissemination and production of information—“a
domain that used to be monopolized by the state-controlled
conventional media channels.”154 A strong civil society exposed to
this brand new information environment and empowered by
newfound possibilities would, the argument went, produce
powerful pressure for political change.155 The Internet was
supposed to generate a body of autonomous voices, a steady cohort
of opinion leaders who would regularly contribute to online
debates and deliberations and, ultimately, transform the medium
into a hotbed of collective action for opposition movements. In the
minds of these theorists, the technology would bring fresh new
elements to the art of protest.156 Yet these prognostications seemed
to have gotten it wrong—very wrong. As one China scholar notes,
“[g]eneral Western assumptions about the political implications of
the Internet in China are not borne out by the political realities.”157
Internet technology, it seems, is no guarantee of online political
152
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activism; this ultimately rests upon the existence of an energized
populace willing to agitate forcefully for change. As the Umbrella
Revolution in Hong Kong demonstrates, widespread political
engagement is not substantially present in China.
CONCLUSION
Despite the unique nature of the Internet, the idea that
democratization is an inevitability of its widespread use is
erroneous and does not apply to the case of China in particular.
While social media undoubtedly offers a tremendous
multidirectional flow of information and harbors extraordinary
potential for free expression, it would be naïve to suppose that this
technical feature ensures the breaking down of information
hierarchies and monopolies or that it is somehow a shortcut to
political transformation. The Internet may provide a forum for
political discussion, but collective mobilization requires a
politically engaged population. There is currently little indication
that this is the case with respect to China. Indeed, the Chinese
government has proven itself adept at nurturing a technologysavvy populace while pacifying the politically destabilizing
potential of the technology. The failure of the Hong Kong protests
to spark wider unrest in the remainder of China—or even among
the greater Hong Kong population—supports the assertion that the
political power of Internet technology has been overstated,
particularly in the case of China. China is not the political
tinderbox many observers believe it to be. The majority of China’s
netizens appear largely politically disengaged.
However, while China has mastered the art of ‘Jell-O-nailing,’
any assessment in this regard is premised on the fact that China
will not experience any major social disruptions that may upset this
political disengagement. Should, for example, China’s economy—
now the second largest in the world and on track to becoming the
largest158—dramatically falter or should some unforeseen incident
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trigger significant political commotion, the Internet will likely be
the avenue through which dissent gains momentum. There is no
doubt that a vibrant online civil society could test the boundaries of
permissibility and forcefully renegotiate the limits of toleration.
For the time being, however, the potential of Internet technology to
ignite civil unrest within China remains, it would seem, profoundly
muted.

